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BOOK REVIEWS

Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion: Aids to Reflection and the Mirror of the
Spirit by Douglas Hedley
Cambridge University Press, 2000, 330pp.
KEN CASEY, Kentucky Wesleyan College
Emerson, in his panegyric on Plato, notes that "every brisk young man
who says in succession fine things to each reluctant generation ... is
some reader of Plato, translating into the vernacular, wittily, his good
things." He lists a series of eminent thinkers, Boethius, Rabelais,
Erasmus, among others, and ends with Coleridge. Modern histories of
Platonism tend to relegate Coleridge to a minor role, at best a minor commentator; however, if Douglas Hedley is corr<c'Ct, the view of Coleridge as
a minor commentator and patchwork thinker is historically inaccurate
and philosophically impoverishing. The book sets an ambitious project:
philosophically it attempts to recover an overlooked rich tradition, and
historically it seeks to set a more adequate context for evaluating
Coleridge. The motivation for Hedley's project stems from a belief that
part of contemporary philosophy of religion has lodged itself in a cuI de
sac. Hedley is out to recover the possibility of a rational philosophy of
religion grounded in Platonic Christianity and Trinitarian speculation.
By itself, either the historical project or the philosophical project
would be plenty ambitious. Yet, the historical project is a first installment of an even grander scheme looming on the horizon of the book, a
work that still awaits us, what Hedley calls" an adequate history of
modern idealism." Before this can be done, Hedley takes on the smaller
task of rightly situating Coleridge who has been read out of context in a
variety of unflattering ways.
First, Coleridge has not been understood in the light of the Trinitarian
debates of the time. Second, Coleridge's Platonism is viewed through the
lens of Schleiermacher's Plato rather than the tradition of middle and Neo
Platonism characterized by Ficino and Renaissance Platonism. Although
these may seem like separate misunderstandings, Hedley makes a strong
case for seeing the two misunderstandings as all piece of a single cloth.
Hedley's work situates Trinitarian speculation amid Middle Platonism
as a way of understanding how a governing and creative form could
transcend rationality and at the same time ensure a rational basis for
understanding it. The Socinians, like the Arians before them, claimed
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that an unbridgeable chasm exists between the infinite and the finite, that
is, between God and created nature. Trinitarian speculation sought to
hold fast in unity what the Socinians had divided. Hedley notes that a
similar dialectic works in Kierkegaard and Barth. Both maintain that
beginning from a finite point of view there can be no rational natural theology. And although in both Kierkegaard and Barth a consistent dialectic
of finitude may lead to despair, and a consistent dialectic of the infinite
may also claim to reveal itself in history as a Teacher, no rational justification exists for the migration from one realm to the other; hence both
thinkers appeal for leaps of faith and appeals to revelation.
Hedley notes that other attempts to deal with the difficulty between
the finite and the infinite expressed themselves in various forms of
monism; notably in Spinoza. In Spinoza's thought the infinite and the
finite are collapsed and God and nature dissolved into one another.
According to Hedley, Coleridge and the tradition of Platonic idealism
attempt to frame a third alternative to fideism and monism. The Platonic
tradition in Patristic theology allowed that God was both transcendent
and rapt in a joyous contemplation while at the same time immanent in
creative activity. Because the contemplation of the divine as a unitary
being included an alterity between the persons in the Trinity, the immanent expression of God in the world need not reflect a unity transcending
all rational differentiation. Fundamental to this account, Hedley notes, is
a voluntaristic account of God's being which avoids the danger of making God's will arbitrary. Coleridge maintains that God's will is prior to
God's intellect, because will does not admit of any preceding cause,
wbereas reason does. Coleridge says, "even in man wilUs deeper than
rnilld~ for mind does not cease to be mind by having an antecedent; but
will is either first ... or it is not will at all" (quoted 111 Hedley, 82). Still,
the will is not arbitrary, for in willing the intellect, there is no possibility
of God willing anything other than what is true or good. God is pure act,
including the act of understanding; following the Platonic tradition, the
good is the measure of itself and of evil. Hedley helps recovers a central
claim of Coleridge's thought that God's will, though primordial to reason
neyertheless wills in accord with reason.
Following some readings of Kant someone might object that all this
metaphysical speculation on the Trinity has no grounding in our experience and dispense with matters. Coleridge, I believe, is well positioned
to develop an interesting reply. Hedley quotes Coleridge to the effect
that, "the mysteries of Christian faith are reason in its highest form of
self-affirmation" (87). The experience of a Kantian critique can take one
to the limits of will and understanding, and in the mystery here one can
find a fruitful Trinitarian answer to its riddles. In short, the mystery of
the Trinity has a philosophical dimension. This is not to say that a fullblown doctrine of the Trinity can emerge on the basis of reason, but that
the mystery of our will can lead into mystery of the Trinity. Coleridge
has here developed a Kantian passage of ascent, analogous to NeoPlatonic accounts. This is a daring assertion and a rich resource for
Trinitarian natural theology.
H.eading Kant as a springboard for a new speculative metaphysic,
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Hedley will probably ruffle a few feathers, for doing so runs counter to
many modem readings of Kant. However, this may be all to the good.
Coleridge's understanding of Kant was not bound by modem conventions and, if Hedlev is correct, there is stillroom for idealism to make an
interesting depa/ture from Kant's thought that still preserves his
insights in a metaphysics of freedom while providing a means of avoiding Kant's dualisms.
But if Coleridge had so much to offer, why was he overlooked, and
why at present has he continued to be overlooked? A parallel question
also suggests itself, why was the Platonic tradition also overlooked?
Hedley'S answer, in a few words is Schliermacher and Harnack. After
Schliermacher and Harnack the Platonic tradition becomes not merely
overlooked but invisible. Schliermacher recast the understanding of
Plato as essentially an artistic rather than a metaphysical thinker by
locating Plato's essence not in the content, but in the form of his
thought-namely the dialogue form. Harnack in his historical quest saw
Platonism as a metaphysical element foreign to the gospel, rather than
an attempt to formulate a coherent understanding of God revealed in
Christ. Doubly disinherited, Coleridge and the tradition of idealism
were thus overlooked rather than critically examined. Given the possibility of a restored rational natural philosophy of religion, Hedley's
argument for a return to Coleridgean ideas seems fruitful possibility.
What might motivate a return to a form to Platonism if one is not
already so disposed? Hedley suggests that Coleridge offers an intriguing way. The Delphic maxim, know thyself, provides the beginning
point. The Platonic notion of ascent maps the way. Drawing on
Augustine's claim that "the true philosopher is a lover of God"
Coleridge suggests that the reflexive nature of the quest for self-knowledge will lead to a reflection on the nature of mind and language that
has important analogies with a Trinitarian understanding of God.
Hedley turns to a deft account of Coleridge's philosophy of language.
Coleridge defines language as "a living power which enables men to
improve their vision of truth" (117). In line with the Augustinian
notions of the interior teacher, Coleridge maintains that language has a
divine origin and that all knowledge of the truth is in some sense contaet
with the divine. Language leads us to re-fleet and to seek a transcendent
origin. Whereas Locke and the Lockean empiricists saw mind as a passive power, Coleridge saw mind and language as an active one. For
Coleridge tracing the origins of ideas to a series of impressions and simple elements that form the basis for more complex ideas was a dead end.
A Lockean natural theology requires that arguments for the existence of
God needed to be amenable to such tracing. Natural theology under
this rubric necessarily falls back upon miracles. Biblical language also is
understood via the Lockean way of ideas. Although sympathetic with
the goal establishing a rational theology of other Lockeans, Coleridge
thought that this account of language and rationality is impoverished.
Language and reason are spiritual for Coleridge symbolizing an inward
experience. Coleridge claims that as a symbol language "partakes of the
Reality which it renders intelligible" (143). The biblical record is not a
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mere historical work to be traced back to sense datum but rather a meeting point in which the human and the divine come together. The language is mystical, experiential, and spiritual. Hedley's masterful mapping of Coleridge's linguistic account dovetails with the speculative
account of the will in a fruitful fashion that I think merits close attention.
Hedley's book is a dense work, closely argued on both historical and
philosophical grounds and will richly repay a close reading. It will
undoubtedly stir controversy among those who, for whatever reasons,
conceive of metaphysics as alien to the gospel or as moribund. Hedley
introduces a rich cast of characters, especially the Cambridge Platonists
and, in particular, Ralph Cudworth. Moving these characters to the
foreground is enriching both as history of philosophy as well as philosophy proper. Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion is a refreshing foray into
speculative metaphysics going full tilt. It is heartening to find a willingness to sort through Platonism with a charitable eye. Hedley turns up
old resources that are under appreciated and offers a fresh current of life
moving within the Neo-Platonic tradition and Trinitarian speculation.
Were a list of worthy Platonic scholars being compiled today, Hedley
might be the next in the line of those "brisk young thinkers rendering
fine things to a reluctant generation." Heartily recommended.

Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues by Alasdair
Macintyre (Chicago: Open Court Press, 1999). ISBN 0-8126-9397-3. Pp. ix166, $26.95 Hard Cover.

NICHOLAS MERIWETHER, Shawnee State University
Those whose familiarity with the work of Alasdair MacIntyre is limited
to his highly influential critique of modern ethical theory, After Virtue, may
be forgiven for finding his recent publication, Dependent Rational Animals
(henceforth: ORA), a somewhat puzzling departure. The reason ORA
would appear to represent such an abrupt change is his assertion in After
Virtue that an account of Aristotelian practical reasoning must relinquish
any reference to a natural telos, or "metaphysical biology." However, in
subsequent works incrementally, and now most emphatically in ORA, he
has fully embraced the view that metaphysics grounded in human biology
is ineliminable from a complete account of the ethical life.
In his rich and provocative work since After Virtue and prior to ORA,
MacIntyre has sought to provide a comprehensive ethical theory and
moral epistemology on the basis of the phenomenon of practical reasoning.
In its Aristotelian embodiment, practical reasoning describes the process
by which the individual pursues goods internal to social practices by
acquiring virtues, e.g., wisdom, honesty, and justice, and orienting action
to those goods virtuously, i.e., in an excellent manner. This process is
inherently social because the novice serves as apprentice to those who have
mastered the practice, though this does not preclude the possibility that the
novice will one day through acquisition of the relevant virtues exceed or

